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Abstract
Wireless Sensor Network is a network type that consists of small sensor devices. The
communication between these devices must be secured in case of an attack. Sensor devices
have to share a secret key for secure communication. There are several key distribution
schemes for wireless sensor networks in the literature. The most common key distribution
scheme is the basic scheme which is proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor. Basic scheme has
three phases; Key Predistribution, Shared Key Discovery and Path-key Establishment. Er-
gun proposed an alternative phase to Path-key Establishment, called Key Transfer phase.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no real node implementation of the basic scheme. In
this thesis, we implemented all three phases of the basic scheme and Ergun’s Key Transfer
phase on a real sensor device. We use TelosB devices, which have 10kB RAM, 1 MB flash
memory, a microcontroller and RF interface. We design flowcharts for each phase, create
packet structures, implement in NesC programming language and test the implementa-
tion. We analyze the results using processing time, code space and memory usage metrics.
We show that Key Transfer phase is more efficient than Path-key Establishment phase.
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ANAHTAR DAG˜ITIM S¸EMALARININ GERC¸EK DUYARGA AG˜I
AYGITLARINDA GERC¸EKLENMESI˙
Hu¨seyin Ergin
CS, Yu¨ksek Lisans Tezi, 2011
Tez Danıs¸manı: Albert Levi
Anahtar Kelimeler: Duyarga Ag˜ları Gu¨venlig˜i, Anahtar Dag˜ıtımı, TelosB Aygıtları
O¨zet
Kablosuz Duyarga Ag˜ları, ic¸erisinde ku¨c¸u¨k duyarga aygıtları barındıran bir ag˜ ti-
pidir. Bu aygıtlar arasındaki haberles¸me bir saldırı olma ihtimaline kars¸ılık gu¨venli
yapılmalıdır. Duyarga aygıtları gu¨venli haberles¸me ic¸in gizli anahtarlar paylas¸ırlar. Lit-
eratu¨rde bir c¸ok anahtar dag˜ıtım s¸eması vardır. Bunlardan en bilineni Eschenauer ve
Gligor’un sundug˜u basit s¸emadır. Basit s¸emanın u¨c¸ evresi vardır: Anahtar O¨ndag˜ıtım,
Ortak Anahtar Kes¸fetme ve Yol Anahtarı Kurma. Ergun, Anahtar Transferi adında, Yol
Anahtarı Kurmaya alternatif bir evre o¨nermis¸tir. Bildig˜imiz kadarıyla, literatu¨rde basit
s¸emanın gerc¸ek aygıtlar u¨zerinde gerc¸eklenme c¸alıs¸ması yoktur. Bu tezde basit s¸emanın u¨c¸
evresini ve Ergun’un Anahtar Transferi evresini gerc¸ek bir duyarga aygıtında gerc¸ekledik.
Bunun ic¸in 10 kB RAM, 1 MB flash bellek, mikrois¸lemci ve RF arayu¨zu¨ olan TelosB
isimli aygıtları kullandık. Her evreyi tasarladık, paket yapılarını olus¸turduk, NesC pro-
gramlama dilinde kodladık ve gerc¸eklemeyi test ettik. Sonuc¸ları is¸lem zamanı, kod boyutu
ve bellek kullanım oranı metriklerini kullanarak analiz ettik. Anahtar Transferi evresinin
Yol Anahtarı Kurma evresinden daha verimli oldug˜unu go¨sterdik.
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1 Introduction
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is a network type which consists of small sensing devices
[1][2]. These devices are connected through RF interface and they usually use batteries as
the source of energy. Moreover, there are a small microcontroller and sensing interfaces
such as temperature, sound, vibration, pressure and humidity.
The most common picture of wireless sensor network is shown in Figure 1. All nodes
(from now on we will call each device as node) are supposed to be connected to each other
and one gateway sensor node performs the communication between these nodes and the
operator. Gateway sensor node is usually more powerful than the other nodes but it may
also be the same.
Figure 1: Wireless Sensor Network
Sensor networks can be used in many areas such as military applications, healthcare
applications, habitat monitoring etc. The application of a sensor network is usually done
in the following way:
• Each node is programmed and the nodes are deployed in the environment. This
environment can be a forest, a military zone or just a home to collect information.
• The gateway sensor node is triggered by a computer or an operator and it broadcasts
command to other nodes.
• All nodes start to work and do the sensing tasks. Moreover they send the necessary
data to the operator with the help of gateway sensor node and other nodes.
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In case of an attack, the messages between nodes must be encrypted. For these kinds
of scenarios, each node must share a secret key with other nodes so that it can send
the messages by encrypting with the related secret key of its neighbors. Since the power
consumption of nodes is limited, strong asymmetric cryptographic algorithms such as
RSA [3] are not suitable. For this reason, we use symmetric cryptography [4] in which
both parties use the same key for encryption and decryption. Also power consumption of
symmetric cryptography is much lower than asymmetric cryptography.
Delivering these secure keys over the air to each node is not a feasible way because of
sniffing attacks. Thus, these keys must be pre-distributed to each node while programming
them. Giving the same key to each node for cryptography purposes is not suitable,
because if a node is compromised, all the network becomes insecure. In order to improve
the security of the network, the nodes must encrypt or decrypt their communication with
different keys. At this point a new problem takes place. The nodes have limited memory
capacity. Therefore they will not have enough memory for sharing separate keys for all
the nodes in the network.
In order to overcome these difficulties, Eschenauer and Gligor [5] proposed a random
key predistribution scheme. It is also called the basic scheme in the literature. In this
scheme, a large key pool is created and a limited subset of this pool is distributed to
each node while programming. Then a three-step method is carried out. At the end,
neighboring nodes establish secure links with shared keys with an acceptable probabil-
ity. More detailed explanation of the basic scheme will be given in Section 2.2. Later
Ergun [15] proposed an improvement for the last (third) phase of the basic scheme. This
improvement will be explained in Section 2.2.2.
In this thesis, we implement the basic scheme in real sensor nodes called TelosB in
Figure 8. To best of our knowledge, there are no real node implementation of this basic
scheme in the literature. Thus there are no processing timing, memory usage or code
space analysis about the performance of the scheme in real nodes. Same thing can be
said for Ergun’s improvement. Thus we implement Ergun’s scheme on real nodes as well.
Our implementation includes both node side and user interface side developments. We
also comparatively analyze memory usage and processing times of these schemes.
2
2 Background Information
In this section, we give some background information about cryptography and key distri-
bution in wireless sensor networks.
2.1 Background Information on Cryptography
Cryptography is the science of secret writing. There are currently two main approaches in
cryptography. These are symmetric cryptography and asymmetric cryptography. In sym-
metric cryptography, each party uses the same key for encryption/decryption purposes.
In asymmetric cryptography, each party has a key pair. In our implementation we use
symmetric cryptography.
Symmetric cryptosystems are preferred in sensor networks because its encryption/decryption
speed is much faster than asymmetric cryptography. In this thesis, we use AES (Advanced
Encryption Standart) [6] as the symmetric cryptosystem.
2.1.1 Symmetric Cryptosystems
In symmetric cryptosystems, the same key is used for both encryption and decryption
purposes. In this scheme, both parties share the same secret or cryptographic key as in
Figure 2 and with the help of this key, they create a secure link between each other. The
most common symmetric cryptosystems are AES [6], Blowfish [7] and 3DES [8].
Figure 2: Symmetric Cryptography
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2.1.2 AES
AES [6] stands for Advanced Encryption Standart. AES is a standart symmetric cryp-
tosystem. Actually it is the name of the standart only. Rijndael is selected as the standart
algorithm by NIST (National Institute of Standarts and Technology of US) in 2001. In
1998, NIST selected 15 candidates for AES. In 1999 five algorithms were chosen to be
extensively analyzed. These are MARS from IBM, RC6 by RSA, Rijndael by two Belgian
developers Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen, Serpent by Ross Andersen, Eli Biham and
Lars Knudsen, Twofish by Bruce Schneier. These five algorithms are tested for speed and
reliability, encryption/decryption speed, key and algorithm setup time and resistance to
attacks. At the end Rijndael was selected in 2001 as AES.
AES has a fixed block size of 128 bits and also has a key size of 128, 192 or 256 bits.
As AES is symmetric, it uses the same key for both encryption and decryption. Currently,
AES is known to be resistent against cryptanalytic attacks [9].
2.2 Key Distribution for Sensor Networks
Sensor nodes have limited memory, limited processing power and limited battery. Estab-
lishing secure communication between the nodes is very difficult because of these limited
resources. For these reasons, the most suitable cryptosystem for these nodes is symmetric
cryptosystem. Symmetric cryptography requires the nodes to be loaded with pairwise
keys for their neighboring nodes. There are several key distribution schemes proposed
[10][11][12][13][14]. Among these, Eschenauer and Gligor [5]’s basic scheme in the most
important one. Basic scheme has three phases. Later Ergun [15] proposed another phase,
called Key Transfer, to be used as an alternative to the third phase of the basic scheme.
2.2.1 Eschenauer and Gligor’s Basic Scheme
In 2002, Eschenauer and Gligor [5] proposed a key distribution scheme for wireless sensor
networks. In this scheme, keys are randomly distributed to each node before deployment.
After that, the nodes are deployed over the field. Then the nodes try to establish secure
communication links between each other.
Basic scheme has three phases. First phase is Key Predistribution. In this phase a
4
large key pool of random keys are created. In this pool, keys are stored with their index
values. From this key pool, a random subset size of key chain size is selected and loaded
into each node before deployment. Key Predistribution phase is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Key Predistribution Phase
Second phase is Shared Key Discovery. Each node has now a small subset (which
is called key chain from now on) of the key pool and will start to communicate with
neighbors (the nodes within the communication range) to find out a shared key with each
neighbor. Communication occurs in two steps. In the first step, all nodes broadcast their
key indices as in Figure 4. In the second step, other nodes receiving those index values
check whether they have this index in their own key chains or not. Since all the nodes
have a subset from the same key pool, they will share a key with a certain probability.
Figure 4: Devices are broadcasting their key indices
At the end of Shared Key Discovery, the status of the sensor network is a semi-
5
connected graph, which is called Key Sharing Graph. An example of Key Sharing Graph
is shown in Figure 5. In this graph, each black dot represents a node in sensor network.
Each line represents two nodes’ sharing a pairwise secret key and a dotted line represents
two nodes’ not sharing a pairwise secret key even though they are neighbors.
Figure 5: An example of Key Sharing Graph
After Shared Key Discovery finished, the third and the last phase, Path-key Estab-
lishment, begins. Some nodes may not have a shared key with their neighbors at the end
of Shared Key Discovery. In Path-key Establishment phase, each node sends a request
to its secure neighbors asking for help to establish a secure link for each of its unsecure
neighbors. If the secure neighbor also has a secure link with the same unsecure neighbor,
it creates a random path-key and sends it to both ends in two encrypted messages. In
this way, insecure neighbors establish a secure link.
An example of Path-key Establishment is shown in Figure 6. In this figure, device 1
and 2 are two neighbors that do not have a common key in their key chains. On the other
hand, device 3 has a secure link with both device 1 and 2. In Path-key Establishment
phase, device 3 generates a random path-key and sends it encrypted to both device 1 and
2.
6
Figure 6: An example case for Path-key Establishment
The complexity of the Path-key Establishment per node is calculated as follows. Each
node searches all neighbors to understand whether they share a key or not. To do so, for
each neighbor, it searches the memory area for the keys that it shares with the secure
neighbors. Thus, the complexity is:
O(n · s) (1)
where n is the total number of neighbors of a node and s is the number of secure neighbors.
Since
n = s + u (2)
where u is the total number of unsecure neighbors, we can write this complexity as:
O(n · (n− u)) = O(n2 − n · u) (3)
Eschenauer and Gligor [5] only proposed an abstract scheme for key distribution.
Implementations of the scheme may differ according to encryption algorithm, key size,
path-key design and so on.
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The performance of the key distribution schemes are analyzed using connectivity and
resiliency metrics as described below.
• Local Connectivity: The probability that any two neighboring sensor nodes hav-
ing a common key in their key chains with which they can establish a secure link.
Local connectivity of the network can be calculated using the following equation in
[5].
(4)
Where p’ is local connectivity, P is key pool size, k is key chain size.
• Global Connectivity: Number of nodes in the largest connected subgraph in Key
Sharing Graph over total number of nodes.
• Resiliency: The number of safe links after a number of nodes (so the keys) are
captured by the attacker.
2.2.2 Key Transfer Phase as an Alternative to Path-key Establishment
In 2010, Ergun [15] proposed a novel phase that can be used in place of the third phase
in basic scheme. In Ergun’s scheme, the first two phases of the basic scheme remain the
same. A third phase called Key Transfer is added instead of Path-key Establishment.
In this phase after Shared Key Discovery, if a node A doesn’t have a shared key with a
neighbor C, node A makes a search process in the key chains of its secure neighbors and
try to find a shared key between itself and node C. After a key is found, node A requests
this key from that neighbor to have a secure link to node C.
An example of the Key Transfer is shown in Figure 7. In this figure, node A is in
communication range of both node B and node C. It shares a secret key with node B but
does not share a secret key with node C. Node B is not in the communication range of
node C but they are sharing a secret key. In this case, node A has key chains of both
node B and node C. It searches node B’s key chain to find the shared secret key between
8
Figure 7: An example case for Key Transfer
node B and node C. After it finds the secret key, it will request that key from node B. In
this way, node A will have a secure link with node C.
The complexity of the Key Transfer phase per node is calculated as follows. Each
node searches the key chains of each unsecure neighbor to find the shared key between
unsecure neighbors. Binary search is used in the search process. Thus, the complexity is:
O(u · log(k)) (5)
where u is the total number of unsecure neighbors and k is key chain size.
2.3 Hardware
In this section the hardware that is used in our thesis is explained in details.
2.3.1 TelosB
We use TelosB [16] sensor devices (motes) from XBow company in our implementations.
An example of TelosB is shown in Figure 8.
These devices are open source, low-power wireless sensor devices designed for research
community. TinyOS [17] runs on these devices, an open source operating system for small
9
Figure 8: TelosB sensor device with RF interface and battery
sensor devices. These devices can easily be programmed via USB port.
Some information from the datasheet [16] can be found in Table 1:
Table 1: The specification of our sensor device: TelosB
IEEE 802.15.4 compliant RF transceiver
2.4 to 2.485 GHz ISM band
250 kbps data rate
Integrated onboard antenna
8 MHz TI MSP430 microcontroller with 10 kB RAM
1 MB external flash for data logging
Programming and data collection via USB
Sensor suite including integrated light, temperature and humidity sensor
Runs TinyOS 1.1.11 or higher
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3 Our Design and Implementation
In this section, we give the details of our design and milestones about the implementation
including testbed, flowcharts, data structures and control panel, which is designed for
controlling the node environment.
First, we give some information about the testbed. Then, the flowchart of each step
in the basic scheme is given. Basic scheme implementation has three phases: i) Key
Predistribution, ii) Shared Key Discovery, iii) Path-key Establishment. Ergun’s [15] Key
Transfer phase has its own flowchart instead of the third phase of basic scheme. After
that, data structures in the implementation are given. This part includes structures, linked
lists and some important parameters about the implementation. Finally, we introduce the
control panel of our system and its features.
3.1 Our Testbed
We have three TelosB devices which can be programmed via USB. Each device is con-
nected to computer while testing the implementation and programmed by using the con-
trol panel that will be explained in Section 3.7. One of the devices is selected as gateway
sensor node and all commands are broadcasted to the network by using this device. The
flow of the commands is shown in Figure 9. A picture of our testbed is shown in Figure
10.
Figure 9: The flow of commands
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Figure 10: A snapshot from our testbed
3.2 Design of Key Predistribution Phase
In this phase, a random key pool, whose size is denoted with key pool size, is created using
the control panel. The random keys are generated by Java’s SecureRandom class. The
keys are stored in a text file with their indices and written as 16 short integers each 8-bit.
Then a small subset of these keys, which is the key chain, are sent to the nodes. The
size of the key chain is defined as key chain size. A packet which consists of the index
and the key is generated and sent to node one by one. An example is shown in Figure 11.
As soon as the node receives this packet, it hashes the index value to calculate the
appropriate memory address to save that key. The address is calculated and the key is
saved to memory with its index. The keys are not sequentially saved to memory. They
are stored as a linked list. The first incoming key’s address is the head of the linked list
and each key is connected with a next address field at the end of the entry. An illustration
of linked list will be shown in Figure 24 of Section 3.6.
After all keys are sent and saved to memory, Key Predistribution phase is finished.
Flowchart of this phase is shown in Figure 12.
12
Figure 11: Key packets are being sent to nodes
3.3 Design of Shared Key Discovery Phase
In this phase, each node tries to find which keys are common with its neighboring nodes.
This is done in two steps. First, the nodes broadcast the indices of the key chain in
a packet and neighboring nodes receive and save them. Then, each node compares the
received index values with the indices of its key chain.
In the first step, each node reads its index values from the memory one by one and it
puts these indices in a packet. Each packet has a configurable size. In a packet more than
one index values are sent. After a packet is filled with index values, it is broadcasted.
The packet is shown in Figure 13. Flowchart of this step is given in Figure 14.
Other nodes receive the broadcast packets and they add the index values to an array
with the related node numbers. Moreover, each device holds a neighbor list which is used
in other phases (Path-key Establishment and Key Transfer). In this neighbor list, each
device is initially marked as ”not have shared key”. The process continues for all the
received packets and for all index values in those packets. At the end of this step, we have
an array of index values with related node numbers and a neighbor list. The flowchart of
reception is shown in Figure 15.
The second is performed to compare the received index values with the index values of
the node and to identify which keys are in common. In this step, each entry in the array
of index values of other nodes will be processed. Each index is read from the array and
13
Figure 12: Flowchart of Key Predistribution Phase
hashed to calculate the necessary memory address. After the address is calculated, the
entry in that address is checked for a match with the current index. If there is a match,
14
Figure 13: Index packet that is broadcasted to other nodes
Figure 14: Flowchart of Shared Key Discovery Phase (Sending Indices)
the index will be saved in another special memory location with the node number and
the node is marked as ”has shared key”. This special memory location is used to hold
the matches of the neighboring nodes and the shared indices with them. The steps are
shown in Figure 16.
After the second step, Shared Key Discovery phase is finished. Now each node has a
list of shared keys between itself and neighboring nodes. Moreover, it also has a list of
neighbors and a flag for each neighbor, indicating whether they have a shared key or not.
15
Figure 15: Flowchart of Shared Key Discovery Phase (Reception)
3.4 Design of Path-key Establishment Phase
At the end of first two phases, nodes share keys with some neighbor nodes. However, some
neighboring nodes may not share a key and can not communicate securely. This case is
depicted in Figure 6. To handle such cases, a third phase called Path-key Establishment
Phase is employed in basic scheme.
In this phase, a node has a neighbor list and in this list there is a flag for each neighbor
indicating whether they are sharing a key or not. The node first scans the neighbor list
and find the neighbors with no shared key. Then, for each insecure neighbor found, the
node makes a request to its secure neighbors. From now on, our current node will be
called as request sender. The node that responds to the request of request sender will be
called as request handler. The insecure neighbor will be called as third device.
16
Figure 16: Flowchart of Shared Key Discovery Phase (Check)
In our scenario, all three nodes are neighbors and request sender and third device do
not share a key, but, request handler shares keys with both of them.
After request sender makes a request for a third device, it waits for a configurable
17
Figure 17: Flowchart of Path-key Establishment Phase (Request Sender)
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Figure 18: Flowchart of Path-key Establishment Phase (Request Handler)
amount of time for getting a response. If it does not receive a response from any neighbor
nodes, it continues with another third device and sends a request for this device also. A
potential request handler first checks whether it has a shared key with the third device or
not. If it has a shared key with the third device, it first generates a random key and a
random index. Then it creates a packet as shown in Figure 19 and it sends the packet to
both request sender and third device. Since request handler shares keys with both nodes,
it reads the secret keys of each node from flash memory and encrypts the packets with
these keys before sending. In this way, the transferof the newly created key is secured.
When request sender receives this packet, first it reads the secret key that is shared with
request handler to decrypt the packet. After decrypting the packet, it gets the newly
created key and its index to be stored in the memory. It also saves this new shared key
19
within the special area of the memory that stores the shared indices with the nodes. This
memory is called as shared index memory.
Figure 19: The packet of newly created key and index
Request handler also sends the packet to third device to notify this node about the
newly shared key and its index with the request sender. After third device receives this
packet, it first reads the secret key that is shared with request handler from the memory to
decrypt the packet. After it decrypts the packet, it performs the same process as request
sender.
Now all three nodes share at least one pairwise secret key in between. The same
procedures are continuously performed until each node shares at least one key with its
neighbors. The flowcharts of all three nodes, request sender, request handler and third
device are shown in Figures 17, 18 and 20, respectively.
Figure 20: Flowchart of Path-key Establishment Phase (Third Device)
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3.5 Design of Key Transfer Phase
Key Transfer phase is an alternative to Path-key Establishment phase for creating a secure
link between two unsecure neighbors. The same name conventions that are used for Path-
key Establishment phase are kept for explaining this phase. Request Sender is the node
which sends key transfer requests. Request Handler is the node which sends responses to
the request sender. Third Device is the node, which does not share a key with request
sender, even though they are neighbors.
At the end of first two phases, request sender has a neighbor list and an array of indices
from each neighbor in the communication range. Request sender scans the neighbor list
and finds the unsecure neighbors that they do not share a key. Unsecure neighbor, in our
case is third device. The request sender has already obtained key chains of each neighbor
at reception step of Shared Key Discovery phase. After request sender identifies that it
does not have a shared key with third device, it searches the indices of third device in the
index arrays of other secure neighbors. The search process is done using binary search.
The main logic in this phase is that request handler and third device are already
sharing a key. We simply request this key from request handler, save it to request sender
and notify third device.
After request sender searches the array of other neighbors to find a match with the
third device, it finds the shared key between request handler and third device. Then it
makes a request to get that key from the request handler.
The request handler receives the request and it reads the requested key from the flash
memory. After it reads the key from the memory, it prepares a packet, encrypts the
packet with the key that it shares with the request sender and send the packet to request
sender.
Then the request sender receives the packet from the request handler and decrypts
the packet using the key that it shares with request handler. It gets the new key from the
packet and save it to memory with its index. It also saves the index of that key to shared
index memory and notify the third device about the match.
Third device receives this notification and adds request sender and that index to shared
index memory. From now on, the request sender and the third device share a key and
establish a secure link. The flowcharts of all three nodes, request sender, request handler
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Figure 21: Flowchart of Key Transfer Phase (Request Sender)
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Figure 22: Flowchart of Key Transfer Phase (Request Handler)
and third device are shown in Figures 21, 22 and 23, respectively.
3.6 Data Structures Used In The Implementation
There are various data structures we use during implementation. Firstly, we use a linked
list to save the keys and indices to flash memory. The linked list structure helped to make
the check process in Shared Key Discovery phase faster.
The address, in which we save each key and its index, is calculated by using a hash
function. Hash function gets index value as input and returns the address to be saved. It
is basically doing a modulo operation according to the slots in flash memory. With hash
function, checking whether an index is shared or not is done O(1) time.
They key packets are stored as a linked list in flash memory. This is illustrated in
Figure 24. Packet 1 is received from the computer and saved to flash as the head of the
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Figure 23: Flowchart of Key Transfer Phase (Third Device)
Figure 24: Sample flash memory after keys are loaded
linked list. Then, packet 2 is received and added to the linked list as second element. At
the same time, the next address part of the first entry is modified to show the second
entry’s address. Moreover, when other key packets are received, they are added to the
linked list one by one. The last element of the linked list has 0 in its next address part.
We also employ a neighbor list to keep track of which nodes are in communication
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Figure 25: Neighbor list to keep track of nodes in communication range
range within the current node and a flag to determine whether they are sharing a key
or not. This list is filled in Shared Key Discovery phase in Section 3.3. An example is
depicted in Figure 25.
3.7 The Features of the Control Panel
In order to control the phases and the nodes, we develop a control panel that is written
in Java language. This control panel supports some functionalities using TinyOS [17]
libraries.
Control panel has basicly four parts: Key Pool, Connection, Mote Control, Basic
Scheme. A screenshot can be seen in Figure 26.
Key Pool: This part is used to set variables (key pool size, key chain size), to create the
key pool and to write to a text file. An example can be seen in Figure 27. In this
screenshot first column is the index of the key and the rest is 128 bit keys written
as 16 short integer blocks.
Connection: Each device is connected to the computer through a unique COM port. In
this part, the connection parameters are set and connections are made. Parameters
are the connection type (serial), COM port number and the type of the device (in
our case telosb).
Mote Control: This part controls the mote. It includes formatting the flash memory of
the node, reading a specific memory location, sending the randomly selected keys
to nodes, reading from memory within a specific range. We can find which keys
25
Figure 26: A screenshot of the Control Panel
Figure 27: An example from the keys in the key pool
are shared between which nodes. Also event log, which is a necessary structure to
calculate time between events, is read from the RAM.
Basic Scheme: This part includes the start commands of each phase. First two phases
are common and Key Transfer phase is an alternative to the Path-key Establishment
phase.
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4 Performance Evaluation
In this chapter, we give the performance metrics and performance results of our imple-
mentation. We use two scenarios for performance evaluation. We use different values for
the parameters key pool size, which defines the size of the randomly created keys, and key
chain size, which defines the size of the subset that is selected for deploying to each node.
These parameters define the local connectivity of the network [5]. Way of calculating
local connectivity is explained in Section 2.2.1. The details of two scenarios are given in
Table 2.
Table 2: The details of our scenarios
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Key Pool Size (P) 15000 60000
Key Chain Size (k) 100 200
Local Connectivity (p’) 0,489 0,488
We have three devices in our testbed. These parameters are set to satisfy the case
that node A shares a secret key with both node B and node C but node B and node C do
not share key in between. In this way, Path-key Establishment and Key Transfer phases
perform.
For the sake of accuracy, each scenario is run 10 times and the average values are
reported.
4.1 Performance Metrics
We use three performance metrics. First one is code space. Code space is the memory
used for storing binaries after compile. We give the code space for both of the scenarios.
Second metric is processing time. The processing time values of Key Predistribution,
Shared Key Discovery, Path-key Establishment and Key Transfer phases will be given
seperately. Moreover, the processing times of the substeps of these phases are also detailed.
Processing time measurements are performed in milliseconds.
Third metric is memory usage for the keys and their indices. The predistributed keys
must be kept in memory for communicating securely with the neighbors. For this purpose,
our device has 1 MB flash memory. The usage ratios of this flash memory are given for
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both scenarios.
4.2 Analysis of Scenario 1
In scenario 1, the key chain size of 100 keys and a key pool size of 15000 keys. This
corresponds to a local connectivity value of 0,489.
Firstly, our testbed is in stable mode as shown in Figure 10. The keys are predis-
tributed to each node. Then, ”Start Sending Packets” command is given to the network.
The nodes turn on the the blue leds while sending and receiving the key packets as shown
in Figure 28.
After this step, reception of the index packets end and the yellow led of each node is
turned on as shown in Figure 29.
Figure 28: The nodes are sending/receiving index packets (blue led on)
Then, indices are checked by sending ”Start Shared Key Discovery” command to the
network and the red led of each node is turned on as shown in Figure 30. At this point,
one of the two phases, Path-key Establishment or Key Transfer can be selected as a third
phase. After all phases are finished, the nodes turn into stable mode again and turn off
all leds as in Figure 10.
Code space for Scenario 1 is 29674 bytes. Key chain size and key pool size are not
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Figure 29: The nodes finish reception (yellow led on)
Figure 30: Shared Key Discovery is finished (red led on)
considered in the code space metrics. They will be considered in memory usage metric
later.
The measured processing times for the steps in each phases are given in Table 3. In
party column, the figure numbers are included to refer to the corresponding flowchart.
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In the rows of related columns, the numbers in brackets are the step numbers in the
corresponding flowchart figure. Number of runs column indicates how many times that
step runs in the node.
The processing time of the Key Predistribution phase is 2064 ms. In this phase, the
keys are sent to the nodes one by one via computer. A node receives a key packet and
save it to memory in 20,64 ms. This step is repeated key chain size times, which is 100
in this scenario.
In Shared Key Discovery phase, each node has an array of other neighbors’ indices and
it compares these values with its own indices. A comparison operation is a hash function
calculation and a read operation from the memory that take a total of 1,84 ms. This step
is repeated for all entries in the index array, which is neighbor count times key chain size.
In our case, this value is 2 x 100 = 200. Thus, this phase takes 369,7 ms.
In Path-key Establishment phase, there are three parties, which were mentioned earlier
in Section 3.4. The total processing time of this phase is 201,7 ms. Reading a secret key
of a node from the memory is an important step of this phase. In request sender, this
takes 5,1 ms. In request handler, it takes 6,7 and 7,3 ms. In third device, it takes 5,1 ms.
This means that reading a key from the memory takes 6,05 ms on the average. Another
important processing time measurement is encryption and decryption times per packet.
From Table 3, we can see that on the average these two operations take 2 ms each.
In Key Transfer phase, we almost obtain the same results for reading a key from
memory and encryption/decryption. The most important step of Key Transfer phase
is the search function. The search function takes 102,23 ms for the node. This step
is repeated the number of insecure neighbor times; this is 1 in our testbed. The total
processing time of this phase is 168,73 ms.
The most important result that we obtain from the total results is that Key Transfer
phase is faster than the Path-key Establishment phase. This is not a surprising result,
because Key Transfer phase reduces the processing times in the third device and request
handler.
We also analyzed the memory requirements for the key and index storage in the nodes.
Index is 2 bytes, key is 16 bytes and next address field is 4 bytes as shown in Figure 24.
That means one entry is 22 bytes. Since the key chain size in this scenario is 100, total
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Table 3: The details of scenario 1
key storage is 22 x 100 = 2200 bytes. This data is stored in plain memory. The flash
memory capacity is 1 MB, that means the usage ratio is 2200 bytes / 1 MB = 0,209%.
Besides, RAM is used for neighbor list, a received index array of 1000 entries and the
variables used in the implementation. 8264 bytes of the 10 kB RAM is used.
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4.3 Analysis of Scenario 2
In scenario 2, the key chain size of 200 keys and a key pool size of 60000 keys. This
corresponds to a local connectivity value of 0,488. The code space is the same as the first
scenario, because key chain size effects only the flash memory usage.
Since there are 200 keys in the key chain and each entry is 22 bytes, that means the
used flash memory is 22 x 200 = 4400 bytes. Thus the usage ratio is 4400 bytes / 1 MB =
0.4189%. RAM usage is the same and 8264 bytes. Code space is also the same, because
there is no change in the implementation of device side.
The processing time performance of Scenario 2 is given in Table 4. As can be seen
from this table, the processing times of the Key Predistribution and Shared Key Discovery
phases almost double as compared to Scenario 1. The total processing times of these two
phases are proportional to the key chain size. Since the key chain size is two times more
than Scenario 1, the processing times also double.
The operations of the Path-key Establishment phase are not so dependent on the key
chain size since index matching is performed via hashing and comparison. As a matter
of fact, when we compare Table 3 and Table 4, we do not see a significant difference in
the total processing times of the Path-key Establishment phases in both of the scenarios.
On the other hand, the processing time of Key Transfer phase depends on the key
chain size. However, since we employ binary search here, the increase in the key chain
size does not affect the total processing time significantly and Key Transfer phase is still
faster than Path-key Establishment.
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Table 4: The details of scenario 2
5 Conclusions
In this thesis, we have implemented Eschenauer and Gligor [5]’s basic scheme’s three
phases (Key Predistribution, Shared Key Discovery, Path-key Establishment) and also the
alternative of Path-key Establishment phase, which is proposed by Ergun [15], called Key
Transfer, in real sensor network nodes.
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We used two scenarios for testing and performance evaluation. We used TelosB [16]
motes in our testbed. We have selected key pool size of 15000 and key chain size of 100 for
the first scenario and key pool size of 60000 and key chain size of 200 for second scenario.
We have analyzed the results of each scenario according to code space and memory
usage metrics. We have also measured the processing times of the phases in details.
Our results show that when there two neighbors, Shared Key Discovery is completed
in less than one second. Another important conclusion that we reach is that Ergun’s Key
Transfer phase is 14,11% faster than its alternative Path-key Establishment phase.
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